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Saving, Finacnial Markets and Economic Development: Theory
and Lessons From Brazil
1. Introduction
One commonassumption in models offinance and economic
developmentis that saving is a precondition to investment and
economic growth - an assumption which wecall hereafter the
prior-saving’ argument. The two-gap models, forinstance, claim
that external saving is required for development if both the
investment-savingand theimport-exportgapsare tobe overcome
(e.g. Chenery andStrout, 1968). The prior-saving argumentis
also present in the financial liberalisation models (e.g. Shaw,
1973 and McKninnon, 1973).2 These models maintain that
internal saving/investment can be increased by Stimulating
savingswith positive interestratesandincreasingthe competition
betweenfinancial institutions through financial deregulation.
That prior-saving argumentis a pre-Keynesian conceptis
recognised by many macro-economists. However few have
explicitly acknowledgedthe full consequenceto the analysis of
finance anc growth, -et alone of finance and economic
developmentof the reversal of causality (between finance and
saving) proposed by Keynes (1936). In this paper, the Post
Keynesian theory is used in searchfor an alternative approach
on therole ofbanks, saving andfinancialmarkets in the process
of development.
The paperis mainly concernedwith the internal mechanisms
to finance accumulation. Nevertheless, given the importance of
the external debt problem in manyless developed countries
(LDCs), the role offoreign debt to developmentis also addressed
Finally, the Brazilian experience from 1947-83 is usedtoillustrate
how such a Post Keynesian approach can be applied.
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The paper is set out as follows. Section 2 discusses an
alternative approach on finance and economic development
based on the Post Keynesian theory. Section 3 presents the
method ofanalysiswhich derives from the analysis in section 2.
Section 4briefly reviews the Brazilian case-study using the tools
developed in section 2, and point to the lessons that can be
leared. Section 5 summarises the findings and presents the
conclusions.
2. A Post Keynesian view ofthe role of the financial system ineconomic development
Keynes's assumption that finance precedes saving hasled to
muchcontroversyand misunderstanding. This viewhad already
been challenged in a debate which involved Keynes, Ohlin,
Robertson and Hicks. 3 In that debate, Ohlin and Robertson
insisted in reinterpreting Keynes's liquidity preference theon
ataneoclassical loanable funds framework. Ohlin (19374, 4
in med that Keynes's €x-post equality between saving an
cepauent was merely a truism that said nothing about the
Oreanism by which investment was financed. In contrast,
precedeaintainedthatdeposits precede loans, andhence savingview andvvestment, Robertson (e.g. 1937a) shared onlin
investme t‘aimed furthermore that in the case of a rise to
ance the’the existing volumeof saving would notsuffice“
to fill the« wer‘an increasein the money supply would ee
is to be avoid. and that would imply forced saving.Ifinfla ul
ave to rise igconcluded Robertson, the deposit ratesW" contre orderto stimulate Saving. post
Keynesiang versy was never properly settled; modern aby
Asimakopulopen It, in a now well-known debate starte ng
ers, Kre ‘el (1983) and followed by replies from. aeon
(1986) and ‘Be (1984-5; 1986). Davidson (1986), Richards
eral (1986). To clarify the matter, Keynes's view one
one used by Godleyoo a stocks and flows model, similar to
inan ripps (1985) for other purposes. tes
"neoclassical meat ¢stment-saving (FIS) circuit - substitu
maStaticviewoftheProcess ofinvestmentfinance
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In contrast to the neoclassical view, the FIS circuit integrates
finance into the multiplierto show howsavingiscreated as a by-
productofthe processofincomecreation. For this reason it has
been used by many Post Keynesiansto prove the precedence of
investmentover saving(e.g. Chick, 1983; Terzi, 1986; Amadeo
and Franco, 1988; Carvalho, 1992; Richardson, 1986). But the
FIS circuit has more to offer as an analytical tool: based on this
circuit it is possible to develop a systemic view of the role of
banks, saving and financial markets in the process of growth.
This is the heart of the approach proposedin this article.
a. A modelofinvestmentfinance based onthe FIS circuit
idates the balance-sheetsofthe principal agents
eenaythe!vankingsystem,the entrepreneursandhouseholds
- ina Keynesian fashion. Each column corresponds to a period
(n) of the multiplier process, and is divided into two other
columns, displaying the assets andliabilities of those agents;
n=0is the initial position, followed by 3 roundsofthe sequential
process; n=N gives the end-of-processvalues. Allvaluesin these
balance-sheets are nominal, but Prices are assumed to be
unchanging.Finally, firms’ inventories and households’ stocks
ofdurable consumptiongoods are notconsideredhere. Financial
assets are cash, deposits in commercial banks and securities.
For simplicity, the following assumptions are made: (1) only
households save; (2) uncertainty has no effecton anyone's
current asset-holding behaviour: balancesare either held for
transactionsorfor (long-term) saving purposes;¢ this is similar
to assumingthat“the marginal propensity to buy placements
out ofhousehold savings” (m) is equal to 1 (see Davidson, 1978:
272); (3) the propensity to consumeis 0.7 and intended Savings
are held completely in the form oflong term securities, which are
issued by indebtedfirms in order to repay outstanding debts;
and (4) there is a lag between the accumulation of active
balances (for consumption purposes) andtheir expenditures,
and betweenthe issueofsecurities and the repaymentofdebt.
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Table 1 - The financial side of the multiplier story: a numerical example
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oane,» that an investmentof50 is entirely
financed by bank
Keynes(vated as a book- keeping
operation aS described by
will gener‘8, 1930: 209). This additional
supply ofbank-money
consum ting a Sequential process of payments
- wages and
amongay on - and, consequently, of transfers
of deposits
of secunition= Ifwe call “intended saving” the
additional holding
each peri “S Generated alongside the multiplier
process, then
u eetofthe Previous additional incomewill
be used to
y S curities and, hence, to repay outstanding debt.
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As Table 1 shows,if the reserves available to the banking
system are unchanged, banks must reducetheir liquidity in
orderto finance investment.5 It must be stressed though,that,
since deposits remain within the banking system, investment
finance need notrepresent a drain of cash from the banking
system.
In the processoffinancing investment, the corporate sector
mustalso increasetheir financial vulnerability - here definedby
the ratio between their loans and their net worth (L/NW). The
macroeconomic reasonforthis resultis that until the multiplier
is complete part ofthe additional savings are not intended, but
result from acceptance ofdeposits in the course oftransactions.
Because at each period the whole ofthe additional intended
saving is used to buy long term securities, at the end of the
process aggregate intendedsaving will be asymptotically equal
to investment {S44=50).§ Andsince firms use those funds to
repay their short term debts, when the multiplier process
followinga one-shotinvestmentis completed, bankloanswillbe
reduced to their initial position (50).
b. “Banks hold a key position in the transitionfrom a lower toa
higher scale ofactivity"’
The above model assumes that bank loans are a causal
variable in determining the level of investment. An applied
economistmayrightlychallenge this assumption,sincecorporate
‘ finance statistics show a higher proportion of self-finance
(retained profits) as a source of investmentfinancing in most
developed economies (e.g. Mayer, 1988). So why not assume
that finance comestotally from retained profits or othersorts of
previous saving?
Thelogic which underlies Keynes's claim thatfinance comes
from banks rather than saving rests upona view offinance as
a sequential process similar to the one employed in the above
model. If this view is taken to its logical limits, then only in a
stationary state, and then only underthestrict assumptions
concerningthe portfolio-choice ofsavers, can “previous Saving”
finance investment. This can be demonstrated by using
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vinRobertson's (1937a: 171-5) suggestion about theOhroushout
in financing investment when investmentis steady
anaebertson pointed out that, where investmentismadeorihe
equal and steady pacefora certain period ofume. aeiment
additional “intended saving” equals the demand vr strated by
finance at any point (1937a: 172). This view is illu rateth
Table 2below,where cstandsforthe propensity toSOaement
rowsrepresentthemultiplierprocessesinitiatedbyan sees. the
(1) equal to 1, undertaken in each period; and the co
tiplierintended saving (S4) created as a product of the multip
process,
Table 2 - A Robertsonian view of overlapping multiplier processes
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ties (S4)aggregate demandfor securionalorinvestmentfinance (1).Thus, inasta tion 0Onwards in Table 2), no additional crealiquidity js necess 2
nT:I order to finance accumulatioinvesting firms
through the issue of
Ss
Keynes's responseto Robertson, that is, his view of finaed
@ revolving fund Which “looks after a flow of investment| ver,
weesnotabsorborexhaustanyresources” (1937a: 209). etenceof “ynesnightly Pointedoutelsewhere (1939: 209), the €
a revolving fund” of credit does not reduce,
“onsubstantiates,
th + for the© causal importance ofbank credit fo
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g.
i le if one assumes. To demonstrate this simp S
thattheorcomnyisgrowingand thatthisgrowth (g) is investment
led:
It = (1+g). It-1
Since the increase of investment only affects the additional
incomecreated immediately after it, then
I, - m.S4; = g. It-1 > 0
state (g=0) can investmentTherelore:oeeedby“priorsaving” iethen only if saversbe totally id all their intended saving in the form of long termagree to ho =1). Yet anyincrease ofinvestmentaboveprevioussecurities in els will generate a demandfor moneyfor financeinvestmentev tautomaticallyprovided (Keynes, 1939a: 209).motive thatis atbanks do not accommodatean increaseoftheAssumethat ce. If the public’s liquidity preference isdemand for Deantier the rise of investmentwill be halted byunchanged,then r investors will bid for funds in the moneythe lack of funds. a cause an increase in the interest rate, 10market, 9 whenmaye is a main determinantof the level of
Since the ht rise may abort the processof growth.investment, *t is banks, and not savers, who hold a keyTo sumep. rocessofgrowth.Only iftheyshare the optimismposition in the p in periods of growth orareled, for any otherof entrepreneursi]date the demand for investment finance,reason, to acco production economy grow. This conclusioncan theayeve no role for saving, but such is far fromrotrecase as the following twosectionswill show.e ,
c. Growth andfinancialfragility
’s (e.g. 1982) financial fragility hypothesis describes
aotenttendency of investors and speculators to rapidly
ine age their level of indebtedness in moments of optimism. If




accommodate the demandfor loans by reducing their marginsofsafety. The netresult is an increase in the vulnerability ofthenetworkoffinancial commitments ofthe monetary economy.In
turn, the viability ofsuch network depends upontheability oftheporrowing units to honourtheir debts (see Minsky, 1982:
The FIS model presented above corroborates Minsky’shypothesis: a growing market economy is inherently morefragile. First, borrowing from banks to finance investmentincreases short-term indebtedness. Firms’ capacity to repaywith their own cash-flows has to wait until their investmentprojectsmature andtheirproductivecapacityexpands.Thereforea bank-financed €xpansion leaves the corporate sector in morevulnerable financial position. Second,in increasing the supplyofinvestmentfinance banks are reducing further their “margin
€rwords,both firms and banks are augmentingd ty of their businesses and, potentially, their€pendence on alternative sources of liquidiFinancial fragili » conehar, but
it may disnems i ty in itself is not a constraint to growth,
Pt the processofexpansion.This is especially trueif ;
ofthewwoffragility causesthe debt-deflation, an expressionA €xhaustionoffinancial arrangements which may lead to
anheinstability (Minskyc . 1982; Fisher, 1933). Debt-deflation
ordertonreneeby units attempting to sell their liquid assetsin
Positions (bankin lindebted firms), to reestablish their liquidity
Some bearish ch 8and otherfinancial institutions), or to satis
regain liquidity aff&¢ ofexpectations (speculators). This run 0
terest rates “cts real expenditures throughits effects 0?
investment andn the availability of funds to finance and fund
To sum up the long-term entrepreneurial expectations.
through book-k © fact that banks can finance investment
yStable Creation of money does not warrant a
fragility, and Process ofgrowth. Growth increasesfinance!
S, we are no ine instability can halt growth. Having sal
financia| mark te position to assess the role of saving a”kets in theprocess of growth.
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d. The microeconomic and macroeconomic roles of saving and
financial markets
Even if, in Post Keynesian theory, individual savings and
financial intermediation are secondary in the determination of
the aggregate supply ofinvestmentfinance, they do matter ina
different context - the question of funding.
From the microeconomic perspective, entrepreneurs and
bankers desire to fundtheirlong term commitmentson a stable
basisbecauseofthe uncertaintyabouttheprospective conditions
ofcredit andlevels ofinterestrates. Thus, thereason forfunding
can be interpreted as a response to a menacingincrease in both
borrower's and lender's risks (Keynes, 1936: 144). That is why,
inaworld ofuncertainty, investmentfinance is characteristically
a twofold process of finance and funding (Keynes, 1937b: 166).
Beingthe loci where funding takes place, financial markets
have an important role in supporting growth. From a
microeconomicperspective, theymayincreasethepredisposition
of firms and banks to engage in the financing of long-lived
assets. Another interrelated microeconomic function is the
provision ofinformationforfirms issuingsecurities, underwriters
and demanders of securities. This informational role can be
summarisedas follows: (1) secondary markets signal the price
of new issues of securities; (2) secondary markets make
underwriting by specialised financial institutions a less risky
business; !! and (3) secondary markets enable investors to
evaluate the prospectiveprofitability ofnewly- issued securities
by enhancing the flow of information (Bain, 1981: 61).
From a macroeconomic viewpoint, funding and, therefore,
financial markets also bear role whichis seldom spelled out.
Thatis, the role of mitigating the increasing financial fragility
inherentin a growing monetary economy.This macroeconomic
role will verymuchdepend upontwointerrelated characteristics
of the financial markets:(1) their size; and (2) their Stability. A
thin financial marketis unlike to be ableto increaseits levels of
operationwithoutsignificantshifts ofassetprices; andavolatile
financialmarketcanprovoke suddenshifts ofthe rate ofinterest
13
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and,therefore, be more damagi
of growth. aging thansupportive
ofthe process
Finally, it is worth remembering that not only thin markets
are highly speculative and volatile, neither is speculation is
short-term phenomenonwhich tendsto disappear in the long
run. Muchto the contrary, the very existence of the s
econdary
markets (where old securities are sold and bought) relies on
continuous trading, which provides the liquidity that makes it
this Sky for wealth-owners to hold long-term securities.It is
setiteenen of liquidity which makes long term bonds an
d
right! es attractive to savers - who, as Davidson (1982: 29) has
and rarelywishf ‘b.arching for safe “liquidity
time-machines”,
period oftime. 0 be “blocked in” to h
olding an assetfor a long




their sh anders ofsecurities and those firms wishing to fund
Short- term liabilities. But one cannotforget the negativeSide,that is, th
these markets, instability broughtby
the speculative nature of
€. Financein open-
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revious chapter that the
thereat between financea
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- especially ofthe role ofexternal d
ebtinfinancingdevelopment
instituti y in these times, whe
n multinational credit-creati
ng
distinction are a part ofthe world sc
enario. Another important
This dist is, of course, that betw
een finance and funding. _
ofthe Lpegeoncanbe stra
ightforwardly used in the ana
lysis
recent e S debtproblem. Oneof
the main problems about the
internationalhee with LDCs’ deb
t was that, even though the




1980s any5 to fund them
were not available in the
1970s/
are man ¥ more than they are n
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y. but one of them is that few companies in LDCs are
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float stocks and long-term securities in the international
organised financial markets.
This lack of mechanisms to fund LDCs’ firms may partly
explain whyin the 1970s, whenthere wasasignificant increase
of international bank loans to LDCs, banks preferred to lend
with floating interest rates (or at short maturities) and the
guaranteeofLDCs’ nationalgovernmentswascommonlyrequired
for such operations. The short term maturities of the rapidly
increasing loans to LDCs almostimmediately putLDCs and the
international banking system into a morefragile position. For
even if such a debt had been usedto finance expansionsofthe
productive capacity to export (which was not, incidentally,
always the case), LDCs could not repay their debt before
such
capacity was putto use. Indeed it only took a rise of interest
rates, causedbythemonetarypoliciesofthe developed countries
in the end ofthe 1970s,to turn the financialfragility ofthe LDCs’
position into the Debt Crisis of the 1980s.
3. From theory to analysis: applyingthe PostKeynesian approach
The measure of efficiency of the financial system in
contemporary financial theory is based upon the “competitive
capitalmarketparadigm”(see Lewis, 1992). From a neoclassical
perspective, in a competitive capital market saving/capital is
allocated optimally; hence inefficiency is related to anything
outside that paradigm: real-life institutional arrangements are
implicitly seen as “distortions” in relation to the optimal outcome
ofthe idealized structure. The role ofanalysisis thusto pointto
the imperfections ofsuch structures and, perhaps,to the ways
of reestablishing the sovereignty of the market forces (e.g.
financial liberalisation).
From a Post Keynesian perspective, financial systems are
more than intermediaries between saving and investment: they
create saving (through finance) as much astheyallocate of
saving (funding). Both roles are equally important in an
entrepreneureconomy. finance creates themeansofcommanding
resources that will permit entrepreneurs to implement their
production and investment decisions; funding represents an
15
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incentive for both banks and wealth-holders to hold securities
and, additionally, reduces the financial fragility inherent to
growing monetary economies. Since neither the availability of
finance nor the existence of mechanisms for funding can be
warranted by the simple forces of price- mechanisms, the
meaning of efficiency here must forcibly have a different
connotation in our analysis.In orderto stressthis difference, we
will use another term:functionality.
Functionality has twodistinctive dimensions:thefirst is the
microeconomic dimension,the second, the macroeconomic. AS
regards the microeconomic dimension, functionality relates not
eneStatic allocation ofexisting resources, but to the dynamic
ocation of resources, which must encompass economies of
scale. Since the under-employment of potential resources
is
characteristic ofdeveloping market economies, investment
will
notonlyincreasethe useofexisting (and possiblyidle) available
Productive resources,butwillalso create them.Thisis one ofthe
(Kon lesson we have learned from Keynes’s General Theory
eynes, 1936).
One® macroeconomic dimension, the functionality of the
function structure should bejudged by howwell it performs the
su te of financing and funding;
in other words, how it
macron . financially stable
growth. Concerning these
e orenomic functions, it is important
to stress that, from
mecanictive adopted here, there isno reason
whyappropriate
spontaneoush to finance and fund
accumulation will
especiall suey evolve in the process of economic development,
(and especialsuchdevelopmentisrapid. Financial
institutions
prefer toremark will, because of the
liability structure,
Ina fast-growing the shorter endoffinancingifthatis
possible.




banks nor other fir credit-thirsty enterprises.
Neither private
stimulus to finance! institutions will have competitive
grow firms will have tng term positions.In this case, in
orderto
Self-fundingor 0 recourse to renewable short term credit,
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As regards funding, it is important to recognise that the
developmentof stable financial markets may require a long-
term strategy and norsimplyshort-term incentives to securities
buyers. Thin financial markets - which are the rule in LDCs
(Goldsmith, 1969; McKinnon, 1973; World Bank, 1989) - tend to
be highly speculative and manipulated by few big “insiders”,
which create a comprehensive mistrust by most small savers
and even somepotential institutional investors (e.g. pension
funds). Therefore, such development mustbe carried out with
careful regulation by the authorities. This regulation can be
loosened according to the development of such markets,butit
is unlikely that complete deregulation will ever be compatible
with financially stable growth.
Finally, it is important to rememberthat in countries where
financial markets did not develop sufficiently to support
financially stable growth, compensatingstructuresare normally
found - suchas,for example, a strong commitmenton the part
of private banks (e.g. the German universal banks), the
development of financial/corporate conglomerate (e.g. the
Japanese financial/corporate conglomerates) or close
governmentintervention such asthe creation of development
banks andtheuse ofregulated selective credit mechanism (e.g.
the South Korean case).
The functionality ofthe indigenous financial systems cannot
be assessed,norpolicy proposed, without a close examination
of the existing institutions and their role in the financing of
accumulation. It is thus naive to assume that institutional
‘arrangements outside the capital-market based paradigm are
less efficient; '2 orto expect thatfinancialliberalisation, including
positive real rates of interest, in itself will suffice to solve the
problem of the lack of long term finance.In fact, our analysis
point out that, in credit-based financial system, ceilings on
interest rates may be rational mechanismsto avoid financia]
instability. '5
Having defined functionality in the context of a developing
economy, we are now in position to analyse the Brazilian case-
study in the light of our Post Keynesian approach.
17
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4. Lessonsfrom Brazil: 1947-1983 14
leet section analyses the financi
al reform undertaken from
64 to 1966 in Brazil and its consequencesto the subsequent
reuonofthe financialsystem and to the economicdevelopment
ones country. The relevance ofthe Brazilian experience lies on
develothat the reform,atleast as regardstheprovision
sfor the
was Peet of mechanism to finance long term investment,
argument‘ by what was previously coined the
“prior-saving
country’s; n a nutshell, the reform attempted to enhance the
the abso avingcapacity and to create m
echanismsto increase
instituticr L. ofexternal saving. This was
doneby a mixture of
incenti nal reforms (creation of inv
estment banks and
ves to acquisition of shares), indexation
of financialai





fi created a financial system which was evenless
existedbert. Brazil's economicdevelopmentthan the
one which
e financial he reform.In addition, it is claimed
that much of
in the 1980s-that whichthe country increasingly
hadto face
instability an atis, internal and external debt, sev
ere financi
System - can be b y speculative character of the fi
nancl
¢ blamed on the 1964-65 financial reform.
a.Abrefreview ofthe period before the reform
The period
characteriseq oe 1947 to 1961 in Brazil's development
1
indus an intensive process of import-substitutiné
industrieseo Itis in this period that substantial part ofthe
Furthermore, Ocucing consumption goods were installet-
the countrycant €specially under the Target Plan (1956-60):
durable consun arapid developmentofits industries producing
would expect inePtion goods andofinfrastructure. '° 4
inthe 1940s ‘syhOuntrywhichwasessentiallystill agriculturé
Capital. Indeed f development required rapid accumula on e
15.4% of Gup ’.2 !947 to 1961 investment was in averae» and in the period of the Target Plan (1956-60)
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17.5%. This investment-led boom made it possible for the
economy’s GNPtogrow in average 7.0%, whereas industry grew
8.7% yearly.
This rapid developmentof the productive sectors was not
matched by the financial development. Until the 1960s the
Brazilian financial systemwasdominatedby thebankingsystem,
andthe latter by the government's bank, the Banco do Brasil.
The financial markets were underdeveloped and dominated by
operations whichwerenotrelated to the financingofproductive
investment. Credit was mainly short-term (30 to 90 days), and
was provided to firms mainly by Banco do Brasil and other
commercial banks. As regards longer term credit, Banco do
Brasilshared the responsibility offinancinginvestmentwith the
Treasury and the National Development Bank (BNDE);
'6 and,
the savings banks (caixas economicas), again publicly owned
financial institution, specialised in the financing of housing
construction.
Thelagbetweenfinancial and economic developmentdid not
represent a barrier to economic development until the 1960s.
Thefinancing ofgrowth washighly inflationary, but as long as
the production ofwage-goods kept pace with the expansion of
nominal incomethe schemewasstill workable: firms could still
finance their expansion through profit inflation and the
governmentcouldstillfinance its deficits through the expansion
of the monetary basis.
In the 1960s, though, such an institutional gap began to
represent a real constraint on growth. The previous period of
rapid growth (1956- 61) was based on the over-expansion of
sectors producing durable consumption goods. However, the
poor income distribution made the market for durable
consumption goodsvery thin, and its expansion dependent on
the availability ofmedium-term consumer credit, which did not
exist. This meantthat, once the major investmentprojectsofthe
Targets Plan mature (in 1960), the country faced a severe
recession, a Situationwhichwasaggravatedbyarise ofinflation,
financial instability and political upheaval. The government
elected in 1961 attemptedto revert the state ofthe economy by
imposing a tight monetary policy andrestrictive fiscal policy.
19
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pitalaetan. mereasingly deteriorating economic and
ituation ended in the 19 itallitary to power 64 coup, which brought the
As other cases in Latin America, the mili i, the mil tary coup provided
some neoclassical economists with the opportunity fopuit into
Dae. their orthodox ideas. One of the such ideas was the
cod tance programme- a mixtureoftight fiscal, monetary
bgppecially) wage policies - which provokedin 1965 decline
-/% in industrial production and of2.5% ofper capita GNP.
One oth i ibat or er suchideawasthe financial reform, whichis analysed
b. The “discipline of the ismi ; i ireforms of 1964-66 arket”: the liberal rationale of the
ofnewadministration explicitly blamed inflation for most
evils included th previousperiod ofdevelopmentin Brazil. Thesediscigeniaat e subversion oforderandsocial hierarchy”, the
in thet etand capital markets, the distortions
“illusory ertie® ea the allocative distortions caused by
and-weaienul ¢ lack of stimulusto invest in basic sectors
1964; 30-34) aoeee and speculation
(see MiniPlan,
wasthatthedieopinion within the government
to correct thes ee ofthe market” should be imposed so as
The stabilisati ortcomingsin Brazil's development.!”
monetary and waa Programmeof 1964-66 - comprising fiscal,
discipline of the eS Policies - was already a step towards the
would have to behen Concerningfiscal policy, the budget
financing ofpublie d alanced and the traditional
inflationary
mechanismsto fh eficits had to be suppressed by introducing
main goal of the ese it through public debt. This was the
tariffs ofthe publi emergencyfiscal reform, whichraised the
Readjustable Nat ¢ sector and introduced an indexed bond,the
a definitive fis ationalTreasury Bond (ORTN). Further, in 1966,
The Banking hag Was introduced.
governmentaera had the objective of providing the
4.595 of 1964 ab ighter control over the money supply. Law
abolished the Superintendency of Money and
20
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Credit and created the National Monetary Coun
cil (CMN), with
the task of setting monetary, credit and exchang
epolicies. It
also created a central bank which was suppos
edto execute the
policies determined by the CMN aswell a
s to incorporate the
function of bankers’ bank andlenderoflast
resort - until then
assumed by Banco do Brasil. Finally, Banco
do Brasil was
expectedto give upits function as the moneta
ry authority, but
to remain the government's financial age
nt and a commercial
bank.
The logic behind the new wage policy
was exactly the opposite
ofthe logic applied to the reform ofthe finan
cial market: whereas
in the latter marketinefficiency had b
een causedby excessive
regulation(e.g. usury law,gold claus
e and the unfair competition
ofofficial banks) in the labour marke
tinefficiency was caused by
the excessive populism of the prev
ious government, which
allowed wagestorise beyond the incr
ease oflabourproductivity.
Therefore, the new wage policy
redefined the method of
readjustingwages(the minimumw
age, wages ofpublic servants
and ofworkers intheprivate sector), which became pe
gged toan
official index. Since,as notedin the
previous chapter, this index
was repeatedly below inflation,
this procedure significantly
compressedthe real wage in
a short periodoftime.
The strategy also involved t
he reforms of the housing a
nd of
the capital markets. With regard to the hou
sing market, the
reformers alleged that the two mai
n factors which constrained
its developmentwere negative real
interest rates andthe ceiling
on rents. The former, causedby
the ceiling on interest rates,
discouraged long- term saving. In turn, the
latter dissuaded
wealth-owners from investing in the
construction of new
residences. The consequence of this
double repression, the
argumentcontinued, was 4 broad
excess demandfor housing-
or the “housing deficit” as official
documents usedto call it.
Accordingly the solution to the pr
oblem was three-fold: to
introduce a new tenancy law which
allowed the inclusion of a
indexation clause in tenancy agreements; to stimulat
e long-
term saving by indexing housing
bills and to promote their
transfer to finance construction,




by thesone Market Law wasthestarofthe reforms proposed
funds did n bee Itwas alleged that the market
for long-term
Save. Thisa evelop in Brazil due to the lack of
stimulus to
havealread aL causedbythree interre
latedfactors, two ofwhich
and thein on eennoted:creepinginflation,interes
trate ceilings
markets A. iciency of the existing financial in
stitutions and
Scarcity erasers to manyoff
icial documents, there was
no
beca avings, butthese were not channel
led into investment
srt of the factors mentioned above.
profitsreateormers blamed the excessive regulatio
n of
the limited ce and the discriminatory
exchangepolicy for
by a donsletes offoreign saving. This
wasthento be stimulated
dollar, by a ent exchange policy pegging the
cruzeiro to the
ihiwduer more liberal policy towards fo
reign capital and by
to borrow the institutional mechanisms
forindigenousfirms
413] of oa, 0,oad. '® There already existed a mechanis
m (Law
loans in f ctober 1962) which permitted
the contracting of
months Tote. currency with a minimum
maturity of six
the riettitn, . sibs following legal i
nstruments were added by
which permi SUMOC's Instruction 289
of 24 January 1965,
directl peeutied the contracting
of loans in foreign currency
of 21 i etweenfirms abroad
andin the country; Resolution
63
e Usust 1964 and 64 of 23 Augus
t 1967 which permitted
Berle,ee of loans
in foreign currency by c
ommercial
into cn investment banks and BNDE.
Theseloanscould be split
and workin0 loansof shorter maturit
y, to finance investment
firms orking capital for national indu
strial and commercial
eareriniie the financial reform was guide
d by the view which
is, the ulti is thesis wecalled the prior-savi
ng argument. That
stimulatedbyat source of finance is saving, which has
to be
and chann ‘i the provision ofpositive i
nterest rates to savers,
financial int ed to Productive investment
through specialised
goal, it wasbel The main obstacles
to achieving this
inefficient non leved, WEL inflation,
financial repression an
wasthen t n-competitive) financialinstitutio
ns. The solution
9 stabilise prices, to dismantle the mechanism
s of
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repression (through indexation) and to stimulate competition
betweenprivate financial intermediaries. Further, competition
was to be enhanced byprivatising the credit market (or by
reducing the competitive advantage of Banco do Brasil) and
openingaccessfor national firmsto foreign saving.
c. The shortcomings of the reformedfinancial system
Perhaps one of the most important achievements of the
financial reformwas the demand-ledboom of 1967-73. Consumer
credit, funded by the issuesofbills of exchange bythe finance
corporations, permitted the 1967-73 boom in consumption of
durable goods,whichthe newly installed consumergood sector
awaited since the beginning of the recession in 1962. The new
housing finance system provided further stimulusto the rapid
growth ofeffective demandbyfinancing residential construction
(especially for the inner-cities and middle and upperclasses).
Together with a looser monetary policy begun in 1967, these
factors permitted GNP to grow in average 1 1.2% a year and
industry, 8.5%. These were the highestgrowthrateseverachieved
in the country and crowned Delfim Netto, the finance minister
in charge, with the title of the champion of the economic
“miracle”.
After this short period of consumption-led boom, however,
the economy began to show signs of exhaustion of productive
capacity. This meantthatifgrowth wasto continue, immediate
increases of investment were required. From 1970 investment
beganto rise rapidly, but even such anincrease wasnot enough
to overcomethe “bottlenecks” caused by the import-substitution
ofthe 1950s. Now more than ever, the need to develop the basic-
inputs andcapital-goods sectors became evident(see Batista,
1986). Already in 1967-73 investment wasin average 20.4% of
GNPand from 1974 (whenthe II National DevelopmentPlanwas
launched) to 1980 it rose to 23.6% of GNP. The period 1974-80
was then to be a period of rapid accumulation.
This was when the shortcomingsof the reformedfinancial
structure emerged atfull strength. These can be summarised as
follows:(1) the maturities ofboth assets andloans continued to
23
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be very short; (2) the existence of indexed and non-indexed
liquid assets provided
a
fertile ground for speculation, which
was unfavourable to the development of long term securities
ma and (3) external debt grew at a faster pace than the
needs °finance the transfer of real resources from above
sed; andfinally (4) financial fragility increased. Each of
these topicswill be treated below.
d. Finance and the rate ofinterest after the reform
fre e had two basic purposes in the 1964-65 reform:
all t, to stimulate Saving with positive interest
rates; second,to
ow banks and other financial institutions to stretch the
maturities of their loans. Indeed a
fter the reform,interest rates
creasedbecamepositive,whereasthediversificationoff
inancial
assets increased significantly. As regards the holding ofassets,
om 1967 to 1973 time deposits increased in average 45.3% a
year; passbook-savings deposits 7.4%; ORTN 17.1%; and
all
On assets had yearly growth rates which were
higher than
However,thereisa longdistance from anincrease offinancial
asset-holding and an effective increase ofthe funds
available to
investment. From the asset-side of the financial system, there
was no substantial change in the maturities of loans and
rPplications: they continued to be very short-term.
Loan term
instit‘continued to be provided exclusively by public financial
Seater tons(e.g. Bancodo Brasil, BNH and BNDE). The private
Treas only lentlongterm those funds tran
sferred to them by the
asury, BNDEand BNHaspart of the special programmes.
€ reason for the failure to develop a private long term
broughtneCialsystemhastodo
withthe risksthatindexation
standpoint oth lenders and borrower
s. From the lenders
normall Cheeexation increased
risk because its loans are
changeyfinnmaturitiesthanitsassets; henceany (upward)
increased withing might causelosses.
The borrower's risk also
linked to inf indexation becauseits financial costs were
NOW
indexed. Th ation, whereasits revenues cou
ld notbe totally
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showed an unsurmountable resistance to adopt indexation.
This, in turn, resulted in a system where, on the oneside, the
public financial system issued medium and short-term indexed
assets andlentwithindexed,frequently subsidedrates; and, on
the other side, the private financial sector issued short-term
assetsbearingnominalrates; andlentshort term,also charging
nominal rates.
As regards the maturities of assets and loans, the wealth-
owners also resisted to hold long term indexed assets. The fact
is that the availability ofshortterm assetsbearinghigh nominal
rates madethe long term indexed assets poor competitors. This
caused areductionofthe maturities ofthe assets ofthe financial
system - including of government bonds. '° As the average
maturity of the assets of the financial system shrank, the
maturity of loans also reduced (Almeida, 1984).
The behaviour of the banking system also changed
substantially with the financial reform. This reform permitted
the development of financial institutions specialising in
the
financing of durable consumption goods and housing. Butit
also permitted the system to profit from speculative usesof its
funds, especially with government bonds. The deliberate policy
of governmentto let banks hold reserves(even their voluntary
reserves) in the form of public bonds, not only restricted the
scope ofmonetarypolicybutalsomadespeculationanalternative
meansofexpansion of the banking system. 2
°
e. Financial markets, speculation and instability
Thefinancialreform of 1964-5 correctly perceived the need to
developa private long term capital market. But implicit laissez-
faire assumption that the creation of institutions such
as
investment banks andtherise of interest rates would suffice.to
stimulate such development was misleading. The introduction
of indexed government bonds raised the floor of the nominal
asset rates offered to asset holders andthe financial costs to
firms. However, this did notlengthen the maturity ofloansto the
productive sector. Moreover, the spread of marketabl
e short
term securities stimulated speculation on which both wealth-
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holders andfinancial institutions engaged in. As regards theirrestrates, the rise of deposit rates caused an expected rise
Furthermore, government's attempts in 1964-5 to develop a
andfis aeterm financial market, based on investment banks
Investme Aheutives to acquire shares, wasa significant
failure.
funds orre never fully acted as suppliers
of long term
oflongtermresented an importantstimulusto the development
marketsufferednane.markets. Ineffect, in 1971 thefeeble stock
the 1980s. sh from whichitnever
fully recovered until
thepoumup. thefailure to develop a private capital marketand
more shortsuon created a financial system which was
System of 1947-€ and speculative than
the underdeveloped
less functi sleek: in other words, the reformed system was
be resum di to development. Asa result, when
accumulation
finance ed in 1974-78, ad hoc measures hadto be taken to
increaseoeoaeation. These measures included the rapid
of the fin NDE's and BNH'’s long term loans. Anothereffect
ancial reform was the increased use of foreign
indebtedness.To this we turn next.
f. The external debt and the internalfinancial system
need inePeriod from 1947 to 1961, there was indeed a constant
finance fre an increasing trade deficit created by foreign
national¢ Tapid internal accumulation. S
ince most private
access toeetPrises (including the public firms) did not have
financin credit from the international financial system, the
mechanisms: the mentioned deficit involved
three main
purchasin S: (1) direct foreign investment; (2) the transfer of
Sector to tiepower in foreign currency from the surplus export
was done b vesting national (public and privat
e) firms, which
mechanismsand. by government selective exchang
e rate
borrowin and other likely selective measures;
and (3)
The fhe with government's help.
internationalai reform of 1964-5 widened
the access to the
enterpris financial system for both public
and private
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inflows andleft a significant part of their allocation to the
markets. Furthermore, byreducingtheflowofinvestmentfunds
to public enterprises, the government's financial policy
stimulated those firms to borrow directly from abroad (Pereira,
1974).
Thetrajectory ofthe external debt in Brazilbetween 1967-73
shows that most of the debt was mainly caused by purely
financial factors, rather then the need to finance real resources
transfers. The consequence was an unnecessary increase of
debt, which in 1973 represented 15.8% of GNP and 202.8% of
Brazil's exports. Oncethestock ofdebt increased (from US$ 3.8
billion in 1964 to US$ 12.6 in 1973), the cost ofrefinancingsuch
debt began to represent,in itself, a major part of the internal
demandfor foreign currency. 2!
From 1974, the oil shock greatly added to the external debt
problem because of the need to finance the increasing real
resources transfers (RRT): the average of RRT/GNProse from
4.35% of GNP in 1967-73 to 11.21 in 1974-80. However, the
country’s capacity to adapt to thecrisis, and, despite the
internal process ofreal accumulation,the RRTdecreased rapidly
until 1977. From 1977, againthe countrybegantoborrow above
whatwasrequiredto finance the real resources transfer. From
then on an increasing part of the debt was to be caused by the
need to refinance the outstanding stock of debt. In order to
obtainthe required foreign currency, thegovernmentkeptavery
tight monetary policy and liberalised interestrates. In addition
to the high internal rates, the government acknowledgedly
forced public enterprises to borrow abroad much abovetheir
finance requirements (see Trebat, 1983). The cost of such a
strategywasto increase the financialvulnerabilityofthe country,
andespecially of the government and of public enterprises, to
the credit conditions in the international market.
Finally, with the change of monetary policy in the United
States in 1979 and the sharp risein interestrates, the rolling-
over of the external debt becameinfeasible and the debtcrisis





between firms. This leads tfra ° 0 a hi
gility, expressed gherlevel ofgeneral financialby hi
financial enterprise= gherleverage ratios ofbanks and non-
N 1947-61 this fragility was mitigated by the fact thatfirms
HeeProt yujation aS a meansof funding their investment.- aS Inflationrose andwithaggregatedemanddecelerated
. bytheentsmechanism became dysfunctional. Intervention
increase of bad2uthorities rose but could not avoid the
collapse offinancial picles in the productive sector and the
of exchange. Stitutions andthe “curb” marketforbills
Thelovreform did not reducethis tendencytofragility.
rise with growth tedness of the corporate sector continued to
However now the and hence the economy's financial stability.
followed indati ¢ interest rates had increased significantly and
rising profits inn closely. This meant that the mechanismsof
and m order to fund investment becamelessflexible
ore inflationary than in 1947-61.
in the1OBSwhyonceaggregate demandstarted decreasing
financial insti financial assistance of the central bank to
the firmssuryj utions andfirmsrose (see Almeida, 1984). Also,
1980s had t vingfrom the bankruptciesofthe beginningofthe
restructurin 0 €0 through an intensive process of financial
ofgovernm 8. This was made possible by significant transfersent fundsto the financial system and,indirectly, by© private sector's ca ital
bonds(see Almeida, 1987). gains from dealing in government
h. Government's fi
1980s unti today lal trap and the economic crisis in the
The whol
ofthe private of 1980s witnessed the fast reversal ofthe position
€ctor(from lender to b ning€ financial ch 0 borrower) and theworse
Government.The fastingch increasingly paralysed the
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at least two everlasting problemswhich needto be theoretically
elaborated. ;
First, in market economies one of the “bright sides” of
recession is related to the fact that the level ofindebtedness is
quickly reduced, so that investment can be once again be
externally financed when growth is resumed. This reduction,
which is due to debt-deflation or to bankruptcies of the most
indebtedfirms, doesnotnecessarily apply togovernment's debt,
since governments cannot (normally) become bankrupt. The
lack ofspontaneous mechanismsto destroy government's debt
and the need to impose adjustment programmesresulted in a
fast increase of both the debtitself and the financial costs of
servicing this debt. This “rising mountain of debt” becomes a
more evidentpolitical target, and the thesis thatall economic
evils afflicting the economy are due to the Government ssize
begins to receive support from wider sectors outside and within
Governmentitself. Finallygiventhe“rigidity” ofthe Government's
financial commitments, the only possible way to adjust is by
reducing drastically the fiscal expenditures.
Now,in any market economy the reduction of autonomous
expenditures are likely to reduce the level of output and
employment. In Brazil, the consequences of reducing
Government's expenditure gobeyond eventhe simple multiplier
effect: because the State, since the 1950s has taken the lead in
determining the process of economic development, the private
Sector's investment decisions havebecome closely related to the
ublic investments.22
° Hence “the State's fiscal paralysis halted the
process of
st reduced it to levels which wereeconomic growth - or at lea
much lower the long term growth average (i.e. 7% yearly). Thus,
the first years of the 1980s mark the beginning of a period of
Stagnation from which the economy, despite its incredible
Performance as exporter from 1984 onwards, never fully
recovered until now.
As regards the financial system, except for the exceptional
Periods (such as duringthe Cruzado Plan in 1986), ithas shown
anenormouscapacitytogrowsimplybyexploitingthe expansion
of the financial circulation.Its gigantic profits have been a sO
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been rising, butits functionality (as defined above) has no doubtbeenseverelyreduced: ratherthangrowingthroughthe support
,
Its
growth is justified by the increasing






presented a Post Keynesian approach on
mic development. The argument centres on
nctionality, which redefines the concept of
financial system as regards the process ofdevelopment.A financial System is functional to the process of€conomic development whenit optimises the use of existingresources in the process of economic development with theminimum possible increase in financial fragility and otherimbalances that may halt the process of growth for purelyfinancial reasons,
ere areseveralways thatsuchfunctionalitycanbe achieved.For instance, Keynes's finance-fundingprocess is based on the
pedbankingsystem andorganisedfinancialmarkets. However, history shows that many other forms ofOrganising the financial system can enhance the functionalityof credit-baseq financial systems. For that compensatingStructures or a Consistent financial policy or, preferably, bothmust exist,
Most LDCs have very underdeveloped bank-dominatedfinancial] Structure. There are theoretical reasons why it isdesirable to develop financial markets: they provide themechanisms to fund investment and therefore mitigate theincreasing financial fragility which accompanies growth. Butthe limitations of a rapid development of such markets berespectedif financial] Stability is also a policy goal.Brazil's development history is not an exception to the case
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i ftmentionedinthe previous paragraph:its industrialsaiierace
the II GreatWar byfar outpacedits financial evelor net to the
wasless related to the “lack of stimulus to saveSosnarketin
inherentdifficulty ofdevelopingalong-term ween nee imposed
an environmentofpersistent inflationandatneeen thet the
transformations in the produ : mpl
OYvate fnancial sector could very profitably Mobilitysascet
specialising in the less risky thatacapital-market based
management, it was very unlikely
nancial yin wouldeHETcratonfinancial re t
howxreform,based on the misleadingeaecanttalmarketsat
to rapidly develop a p i
allcosts.canbe verydestabilising in what concerns the long
of growth. in this
 TThecesepects e such reform have been discussedins
r. First. in order to raise interest ratte eendindexed
introducedindexedbondsandothergovernment ise the same
assets. The failure ofgovernment attempts to v fragmented
ractice on private institutions, created a Seeexe5 assets
financial system, where indexed and "speculation and thecoexisted which increased the scope for sp
tem. d the
need“thehighly speculative inane raced therisk.
persistence ofinflationincreased, rather than
ivateand savers. So the privacial institutions rt termfee oon ntinued to be dominated by the Shortt mtancial system co term credit, such as the financing
operations. The longe ction was left to the
industrial investment and civil constru ment Bank andeloState, respectively throughits National Develop
Ns National Housing foatheopened the opportunitiessorams
saving.tborowabroad,allegedlyinordertocapture xersvoperly
fins ncefefadets. Fence such Openness,associa
with,the exces tional conditions in the foreignborrowing,far
mark in the 1970s provoked aboosto or specially in the
abovetr finance requirementsofthe economy, espe .
3]
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erowth 1967-73. After 1974, governmen
tcontinued with the
ente Henndebtstrategy, thistime explicitlystimu
latingpublic
projectsassoetendwt in order to fin
ance the their investment
(1974-78), €d with the Second National Developme
ntPlan
5 reformwduacy offinancial system that emer
gedafter 1964-
1970s are their consequencesfor the develop
ments in the
intensity fth‘looked by the existing literatu
re in view of the
and the int ¢ disequilibria caused the subsequentoil
shocks
reduced in crest shock. The importance of t
hose shocks is not
imposedb the analysis. Butfocus is placed on the c
onstraints,
ofthe 1970; ¢ financialstructure, in overcomingthe
challenges
ofthes sterThisroleis associatedwith thestructuralweak
ness
follow ™ which wasreinforced by the mislea
ding approach
ed by the 1964-66 financial reform.
e lessons from Brazil, wh jan
e » when read from a Post Keynes
enhancingroSomestrongpolicyimplications.Policy towards
development Shanwonality ofthe financialsystem to
economic
Policy as on Should focus as much on an appropriatefinanci
Policy, it mu patutional development. As regards financial
especially bankel remembered that financial institutions
(and
to remain inthe uebecause ofthe liability structure, prefer
fast-growing on ortendoffinancingifthat is possible. In 4
financial instiConomy, with constant pressure on finance, the
tutions can profitably grow simply by providingShort-
. normance to credit-thirsty enterprises. Neither private
Stimulusto T financial institutions will have competitive
rowfirmswile long term positions.In this case,in orderto
Self-funding or forei to recourse to renewable short term credit,
mvestment project. indebtedness in orderto implementthelrth .
Positive realaoeto expectthatfinancialliberalisation, including
Problem of the la ofinterest, in itself will suffice to solve the
Pointoutthat ire of long term finance. In fact, our analysisrates in itsa -. credit-basedfinancial system,to raise interest
resources not increase the efficiency of allocation 0
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retarding the processoffinancial development.
In whatconcernsinstitutional development,it is important
to recognise that this mustbe a long term policy. Thin financial
markets, whichare the rule inLDCs, tendtobehighly speculative
and manipulated by few big “insiders”, which create a
comprehensive mistrust by most small savers and even some
potential institutional investors (e.g. pension funds). Therefore,
such development mustbe carried out with careful regulation
by the authorities. This regulation canbe loosened accordingto
thedevelopmentofsuchmarkets, butitisunlikelythatcomplete
deregulation will ever be compatible with financially stable
growth.
Finally, it is important to rememberthat in countries where
financial markets did not develop sufficiently to support
financiallystable growth, compensatingstructuresare normally
found - such as, for example, a strong commitment on the part
of private banks (e.g. the German universal banks), the
development of financial/corporate conglomerate (e.g. the
Japanese financial/corporate conglomerates) or close
governmentintervention such as the creation of development
banks andthe useofregulatedselective credit mechanism(e.g.
the South Korean case). It seems that LDCs, and perhaps
multilateral agencies (e.g. World Banks and IMF), have more to
learn from these experiences than from the capital-market
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5 This article presents a Post Keynesian approachto therole of
. financial markets and saving in economic development.
It builds on Keynes's conclusion that investment causally
precedes saving, to demonstrate that banks, and not savers,
have the key role in the process of investment finance and
growth. Saving andfinancialmarkets are shown to havethe role
° unding investment - which maybecrucial in preventing the
nancial fragility inherent in the process of growth from
ccterioneeds, irhe financial instability. Finally, the Brazilianused both to illustrate howth ch
to finance and econ e Post Keynesian approa
omic developmentcan be applied; and to
basepolicies for financially stable long-term economic growth.
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1 From the Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro. This paper was
developed outofmyPh.D.dissertation atUniversityCollege London under
the supervistonofProfessor Victoria Chick, who Is warmly thanked. The
usual caveats obviously apply.
2 Fora critical appraisal ofthe financial liberalisation models, see Studart
(1993).
3 See Keynes, 1936; 1937a,b; 1938; 1939; Robertson, 1937a,b; Ohlin,
1937a,b; and Hicks, 1937b.
4 Uncertainty in portfolio choice decisions, which represents a crucial
aspect of Keynes's theory, will be addressed later.
§ Banks’liquidity can be measured by thedifference between the turn-
overoftheirassets in relation to the turn-overoftheir liabilities. However,
assumingthatalldeposits aredemand deposits, the reserve/depositratio
(row 15 ofTable 1) may be used as a measureofbanks’ liquidity.
6 This should not be confused with the identity between saving and
investment. At any point aggregate saving will correspond to the non-
consumed income, whichts held eitherina definite form (securities) or in
the form ofadditional transactions balances (deposits). On this see Chick
(1984).
7 Keynes (1979: 222).
8 This ts exactly whatTable 2 shows: at any period before the stationary
state is established (1.e.afterperiod N), S4 is lowerthan investment(S4<1),
9 Theotherpossibility is to borrow from the internationalbanking system,
even though this demandfor finance may notbedirectly related to the
acquisition of a capital good from abroad. In this case, the additional
supply offinancewill comefrom the central banks’ conversionofthe loans
into national currency, whichts exactly as ifthe monetary authority had
decided to accommodate the additional demand for money by expanding
the monetary base. This possibility will be analysed below in moredetail.
10 As Keynespointed out: “Therate ofprior saving only tells us how much
ofthe currentinvestmentcanfind apermanenthomebeforehand without
upsetting the liquidity position and the long-term rate of interest, and
without time lag. Subject to these conditions, the incrementof current
investment over prior investment (or saving) can only be cared for
permanently outofthe incrementofcurrentsaving; and the period during
which currentsavingsare kept liquid by their owners mustbe bridged by
an increasein the revolving fundof‘finance’,|.e., of liquid funds provided
by the banking system or by dehoarding.It is the role of the credit system
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Textos para DiscussGo
to provide the liquid funds whichare required firstofall by the entrepreneurduringtheperiod before his actual expenditure, and then by the recipientsof this expenditure during the period before they have decided how toemployit” (Keynes, 1939: 284-5: my emphasis).
"1 The underwriter bears the responsibility for the acquisition of thesecurities which are not absorbed by the marketafter the price offeredreachesa pre-established minimum.So the institution mustbe preparedto take up sharesifcalled uponto do so, and therefore it must have accessto cash whenthis occurs. This access can be provided by creditlines withbanks,butit may also be necessary to sell someofits assets. Since itsassets arelikely to be primarily securities, then secondary markets are
obviouslyusefulto provide the underwriter with cash whenitis required.
2 This terminology ts due to Zysman (1983). He defines a capital market-
based system as one where thecapital market is developed and provides
firmswith a significant part oftheir long-term financial needs.In contrast,a credit- based system ts one which the capital market is weak and firms
depend heavily on credit for raising finance beyond retained earnings.
18 This concluston has been stressed by manyneo-structuralisteconomists.See e.g Taylor (1991: 1] 1-24) and Dutt (1991),
‘* All data mentioned hereafter in this section, unless otherwise stated.
e from thestatistical appendix
Ft.dissertation (Studart, 1992)" mens OF chapters 7 fo 9 of my'S In the process of industrialisation which took place in the 1950s, there
an Implicit “diviston of labour” between public sector, private foreign
aietoh andthe national private capital. Governmentinvested heavily in
mai nm Tastructure, especially transport and energy;foreign firms investe
nly In consumer durable Industry andcapital goodsindustry: private
» the weakestleg of this “tripod” invested mainly 1n the
industrial develonn, Sector. This “arrangement” was to characteriselopmentofthe co hanalysisof the period ts found in Lessa 1983then onan thyorong
16 Th B 0
enterprisesswe wah in 1952to finance investment made byre
Inthe 1970s did § public funds andothertransfers for this purpose. il.BNDE begin to fi swe!nance antes a:7 The folloviii € national private comp
ig pa the
government's stabilisans from an offictal document, which presentsthe reforms: onpolicy, gives the liberal tonewhich would &
Must be orientaevemment action in the democratic political s¥awarrant maximum effets theestablishment of the conditions wet€conomies.In this context, thesee® reesures
10)
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that will create the order in which the marketforces will function...”
(MiniPlan, 1964: as quoted in Almeida, 1984:5).
18 Fora extended description of the government's view on the questionof
the need ofexternal saving andofthelogic behind the policy implemented
in the period from 1967 to 1973, see BancoCentral do Brasil (1973: 11-
39).
f the stock19 In 1964, when ORTN werefirst issued, the average maturity o
of these assets in circulation was 59 months;in 1971, the same maturity
was 20 months. See Brazil's Central Bank Report, 1973, p.184.
20 In 1973 44% ofthe stock of ORTNwasheld by the banking system an
d
BNH asreserve requirements atorderofthe central bank;further 41 4
were held by commercial banks and other financialenimaf part oO
theirassetportfolio; only 15% washeld by the public. For detailed data see
Brazil's Central Bank Report, 1973, p. 185.
21 From 1967 to 1973the participationofthe real resources tran
sfer onite
total capital inflowwasonly 19%, whereas profitremittances and eect
;ly
interest charges and debt amortisation absorbed 66% oftota’ ay ;
inflows. One of the most striking indication of the financialEEof
such indebtednessts thefact that increases of reserves absorbed 16%
o
the capital inflows.
22 However, see G. Studart (1992).
4)
